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This paper elucidates that there exists (weak) substitution relationship between a 
bank loan (BL) channel and a corporate bond (CB) channel confirmed by analyses 
of multi-national data. The degree of substitution seems to be higher after the 
financial crisis. In particular, this counter-cyclicality between the BL and CB 
appears more clearly under the GDP shock. Two of key results, i) higher level of 
substitution between BL and CB channel after a macroeconomic impact ii) the 
consistent counter-cyclicality between CB and GDP growth rates, provide a policy 
implication. Thus, if CB markets are developed and controlled efficiently with 
minimization of detrimental effects caused by default risks, a CB channel would 
play an important role in funding credits for firms when there is illiquidity in a 
bank financing channel. 
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    Since the 2008 global financial crisis, credit supply channels through financial 
intermediaries, banks, to non-financial firms have been constrained. This financial 
friction in banking sector has made these firms to find alternative channels of 
financing. According to the Financial Times, $120bn of corporate bond was issued 
even for one month, August 2012.1 Moreover, The Economist pointed out that 
banks have not been able to lend enough money for firms because of the tightened 
regulations on banks’ balance sheets and the concern about higher fund raising cost 
of banks themselves.2 The substitution between credit financing channels under 
the economic and financial recessions has been also captured by academia. 
According to Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012), a corporate direct financing channel 
of the US firms described by corporate bond volume has expanded since the 2008 
global financial crisis. The authors argue that this increase of corporate bond 
issuing of US firms has tended to “make up” the decline of the credit supplied by 
the banking sector. The shift of the financing composition of firms caused by the 
constrained credit supply from intermediated institutions is supported by several 
literatures such as Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993), Baumann, Hoggarth and 
Pain (2005), and Becker and Ivashina (2011).  
    However, it is not sure until when this kind of “disintermediation” would be 
continuous. Moreover, there is lack of evidence that justifies this kind of financing 
channel shift in fundamental one. The reason is that current situation seems to be 
happened by that large scale of investment fund cannot find profitable investment 
markets because of low key interest rate and too much low yield rate of riskless 
assets such as U.S Treasury bonds. Furthermore, larger firms tend to issue 
corporate debt with much higher volume. Thus, the larger firm size is, the easier 
bond financing is (Denis and Mihov (2003), Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012)). 
                                          
1 Michel Stothard and Mary Watkins, “Corporate Debt Issuance Red Hot in August,” Financial Times,  
  26 August 2012 
2 “Buttonwood: Money for Nothing,” The Economist, 4 August 2012  
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    Having various sources of the credit supply, nevertheless, would be an 
effective strategy for firms regarding the perspective of risk allocation or risk 
hedging. In addition, if alternative channels become vitalized as much as the 
intermediary financing, this would play an essential role in alleviating systemic risk, 
which is triggered by financial market crisis. Furthermore, as mentioned in the 
beginning, the substitution between two funding sources has occurred in real 
economy. To explain this substitution theoretically, Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012) 
suggests a model using Value at Risk. Also, De Fiore and Uhlig (2011, 2012) builds 
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to present an optimal 
choice of the external financing channel among alternatives. In particular, De Fiore 
and Uhlig (2012) provides three “financial shocks” to affect firms’ decision on 
whether they modify their debt composition: higher bank financing cost, lower 
“capital quality”, and higher economic instability. The second and the third factors 
are also introduced in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and in Christiano, Motto, and 
Rostagno (2010) respectively. De Fiore and Uhlig (2012) finds that ratio of each 
financing channel among total credit pool becomes changed when banking credit 
cost increases that is caused by higher inefficiency of banks. Under this 
circumstance, the authors construct a DSGE model replicating macroeconomic 
situation. They point out that detrimental effects on investment and output become 
amplified if there is no bond financing channel. Furthermore, De Fiore and Uhlig 
(2011) mainly focuses on comparison between the US financing structure and EU 
area in terms of accessibility to corporate credit risk information. This paper argues 
that the share of bank loans of the US firms among total debt composition is 
relatively lower than that of the Eurozone firms because European governments put 
more weight on the role of banks to provide credit information of firms. 
    In the case of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), wealth level is positively related 
to possibilities of direct financing. This means that a firm with higher net worth 
would have more chances to enter the debt market such as corporate bonds. They 
also premise a remark that banks have stronger monitoring power to financial 
conditions of firms compared to private investors, who buy corporate bonds. This 
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means that corporations with large volume of net financial capacity have incentives 
to expand the composition of funding through direct financing. This result is also 
consistent with the argument of Repullo and Suarez (2004).  
    Becker and Ivashina (2011) insists that substitution between bank loan and 
corporate bond is mainly caused by credit supply channel when there are tightening 
credit lending standards, larger volume of non-performing loans, and smaller 
volume of total credit scale. Furthermore, the authors explain that the changes of 
substitution level between the bank finance and external finance provides a signal 
forecasting the contraction of credit supply to both firms that can and cannot access 
to public bond markets. Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012) describes that “larger and 
tangible assets” and better credit rating are two of main factors that play a 
significant role in bearing the drastically lower credit supply during the financial 
crisis. This implies that firms having conditions for entering into both direct and 
indirect financing source are more sustainable even in financial downturn. 
    Many pieces of the previous research, however, usually focus on an individual 
country or a specific region such as the United States (US) and European Union 
(EU). The composition of credit source of non-financial firms in the US is a kind of 
exceptional case. According to the US Flow of Funds, the ratio of corporate bond 
financing of these firms is more than 50% among the total credit. Furthermore, the 
composition of credits are various even within Europe according to data, which 
will be provided in Section 2. This means that it is necessary to examine the trends 
of more countries in different regions to confirm whether the issues mentioned 
above are common in credit financing channel (of each country). This paper will 
focus on the grasp characteristics of credit financing channel changes during the 
recent financial crisis. To do this, it will be confirmed whether there exists a 
substitution relationship between bank loan and corporate bond in non-financial 
firms or private sectors of 20 sample countries.3 Then, in these 20 countries, it will 
                                          
3 Australia, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico,  




be examined whether the degree of this substitution becomes higher since the 2008 
financial crisis. These will be implemented in Section 2 and Section 3 through 
cross correlation estimations, regression analyses, Granger Causality test, and 
impulse-response functions derived by vector autoregression (VAR) models with 





































2. Data Analysis 
 
2.1. Data Description 
 
    For multi-national analyses, I select countries with following two criteria.4  
    First, among countries surveyed in 12C. Corporate Issuers – 12. International 
Debt Securities by Nationality of Issuer – Securities Statistics and Syndicated 
Loans – Securities – Bank for International Settlements, I choose countries 
satisfying the following two conditions: 
 
* All corporate bond outstanding volume data exist during Q1 2000 ~ Q4 2011. 
* Countries also surveyed in 16B. Financial Institutions and Corporate Issuers – 16. 
Domestic Debt Securities by Sector and Residence of Issuer – Securities – Bank for 
International Settlements 
 
    Second, among the countries in the first criterion, countries providing two 
categories of data – bank loan to non-financial firms (or private sector) 5 
outstanding volume and real GDP growth rate – from Q1 2000 to Q4 20116 are 
become the subjects of this research.  
    These 20 subject countries are divided with four groups in terms of the 
average ratio of corporate bond volume (outstanding) among total credit pool 




	 	 	 		 	 	
100. 
 
Through this calculation, Group 1 (G1) is defined as countries that have the ratio 
larger than 40%. Also, Group 2 (G2) includes the countries with value higher than 
                                          
4 More specific information about data sources is provided in Appendix I.  
5 Because of the limit of data sources, there are two types of bank-lending as follows. 
 
  <Bank Lending to Total Private Sector> <Bank Lending to Non-Financial Corporation> 
Brazil, Finland, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Mexico, Thailand 
Australia, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States, Republic of Korea 
 
6 Some countries – Greece, Ireland, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Spain – have missing data. Data  
   period setting information is explained in Appendix I. 
 
6 
30% and under 40%. Countries in Group 3 (G3) have the ratio more than 20% and 
fewer than 30%. The last group, Group 4 (G4), indicates the country category 
having the value under 20%. The country division in each group is informed in 
Table 1. 
Period Average Ratio (%) Category 1 by Ratio 
United States 59.85 Group 1 
≧ 40%  France 46.30 
Greece 35.76 
Group 2 
30% ≦ 40%  


















Hong Kong 6.25 
Spain 5.11 
Ireland 1.88 
Table 1. Country Group 
 
Along with this quantitative categorization, for Section 2.2 Aggregate Level 
Analyses, regional groupings are implemented in Table 2.  
 
Period Category 1: by Ratio Category 2: by Region 
Republic of Korea G2 Asia – Pacific 
Thailand G2 Asia – Pacific 
Japan G4 Asia – Pacific 
Australia G4 Asia – Pacific 
Hong Kong G4 Asia – Pacific 
France G1 Core Europe 
United Kingdom G2 Core Europe 
Germany G4 Core Europe 
Greece G2 PIIGS Europe 
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Portugal G3 PIIGS Europe 
Italy G3 PIIGS Europe 
Spain G4 PIIGS Europe 
Ireland G4 PIIGS Europe 
Finland G2 Other Europe 
Netherlands G2 Other Europe 
Sweden G2 Other Europe 
Norway G3 Other Europe 
United States G1 North and South America 
Mexico G3 North and South America 
Brazil G4 North and South America 
Table 2.
 
Country Group by Ratio and Region Standard  
(PIIGS stands for Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain.) 
 
In Category 2, European countries are divided by three subgroups - Core, PIIGS, 
and Other - reflecting the on-going fiscal crisis. Thus, countries in the core group 
have had the largest economic volume in terms of GDP and suffered less from the 
European sovereign debt crisis than countries in PIIGS Europe group. Other 
Europe group contains the countries, which have smaller economic size compared 
to the nations in core group and have been relatively less affected by the fiscal 
crisis.7  
    Units of all volume data are local currencies. This is to minimize the 
overestimation or underestimation caused by exchange rate. Since all corporate 
bond volume (outstanding) data from BIS are presented in US Dollar, they are 
recalculated by exchange rate (end of each quarter) data in International Financial 
Statistics (August 2012). In order to commit stationarity of time series analysis, all 
data will be analyzed by growth rate except aggregate level analyses in Section 2.2. 
Both bank loan growth rate and corporate bond growth rate are provided by natural 
log difference and seasonally adjusted by moving average method. Most of time 
series growth rate data sets are stationary during the total periods of review 
confirmed by the unit-root test. From now on, unless it is specially stated, BL and 
CB mean bank loan and corporate bond respectively. 
                                          
7 IMF, “World Economic Outlook Database April 2012,”  
  <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx> (27 September 2012) 
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2.2. Aggregate Level Analysis 
    : Corporate Bond Volume Ratio among Total Credit, Change of Bank  
      Loan Volume and Corporate Bond Volume (Quarter on Quarter)    
 
    To confirm whether the substitution relationship between bank loan and 
corporate bond described in Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012) and De Fiore and Uhlig 
(2012) is found, values of corporate bond volume ratio among total credit (CBR), 
change of bank loan volume (BLVC), and change of corporate bond volume 
(CBVC) are described from Figure 1 to Figure 5 grouped by Category 2. Before 
the further expansion, in BLCV and CBVC, if the bar in the diagram is denoted at 
Q2 2000 period, this describes the amount volume change between Q1 2000 and 
Q2 2000. This is applied to all periods. 
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Figure 1. North and South America Group: US (G1), Mexico (G3), Brazil (G4) 
     
According to Figure 1, US and Mexico show similar trends both in CBR during all 
periods. However, as regarding the BLVC and CBVC from the end of 2008, a 
reason of trends similarity between two countries seems to be somewhat different. 
On the one hand, BL volume change of US has stayed negative until the beginning 
of 2011. On the other hand, CB volume change of US has been positive until Q4 
2011. That is why CBR has become increased since Q3 2008. By the way, in 
Mexico, net volume of both BL and CB has been positive except for four periods 
since Q3 2008. That is, the overall incremental of CBR comes from the larger 
amount of CBVC compared to BLVC. In the meantime, the financing channel in 
Brazil seems to depend on BL mostly. Although the BL data of Brazil includes 
lending to all private sectors, the data of BL in Mexico also contains all lending 
amounts of commercial banks to private sectors. Thus, at least, it may be stated that 
the CB channel in Brazil is much less developed compared to other two North 
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Figure 2. Core Europe Group: France (G1), United Kingdom (G2), Germany (G4) 
 
    In Figure 2, the CBR, BLVC, and CBVC of the core European countries are 
described. Overall trends of CBRs of France and UK move similarly. From Q1 
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become lower continuously. The CBRs of two countries have generally increased 
since these periods. The movement is also consistent with the case of the US. The 
sources of this, nonetheless, are distinct. In France, both net BL volume and net CB 
volume are stayed in positive level in the most of the early stage of the financial 
crisis, from Q1 2008 to Q4 2008. However, from Q1 2009, most of the CBR 
increase seems to be caused by positive net CB volume. Compared to the CBVC, 
the net BLVC is quite small or similar to those of CB (except Q1 2011), which 
countervail changes of BL and CB. The case of the UK is somewhat opposite. Thus, 
the rising of CBR values from Q1 2009 is originated from the fact that BLVC 
negatively with much larger absolute size than CBVC. Dissimilar from above two 
core European countries, the CB financing channel in Germany still plays in 
tenuous role in funding credits. Although the BL volume data of Germany consists 
of bank lending amounts to all private sectors, low level of CB channel may be 
justified by high reliance on banking sectors in credit market of Germany. Under 
this circumstance, it is obscured to state that continuous increasing in CBR is 
caused by a drastic shift between BL channel and CB channel.      
    For the analyses of the countries in PIIGS Europe Group, they are divided 
with two sub-groups, which are presented in Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2. The former 
includes the countries having higher than 20% of CBR on average such as Greece, 
Portugal, and Italy. The latter contains countries having CBR fewer than 20% on 
average such as Spain and Ireland. The CBR of Greece seems to increase in 
principle until Q1 2010. However, higher CBR in 2009 is caused not by positive 
CBVC but by negative level BLVC. This fact indicates that since Q4 2009 when 
sovereign-debt crisis of Greece began in earnest, both financing channels have not 
functioned well to supply credits into non-financial firms. In the meantime, the 
CBR of Portugal has been increased on the whole since 2004 with some 
fluctuations. However, it is difficult to evaluate that one channel replaces the other 
one significantly in Portugal. In particular, since Q3 2009, the declination of net BL 
volume has not been cancelled out by CB financing. Thus, the continuous CBR rise 
of Portugal from the second half of 2009 is mainly caused by larger negative 
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volume change of BL. Net BLVC and CBVC in Italy from 2009 to 2011 shows 
clearer substitute relationship between two financing channels. This characteristic, 
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Thus in 2009, the CB channel compensates the loss of credit from the BL channel. 
On the contrary, in 2010 and 2011, funding through the BL mutes the decreasing 
credit supply through the CB channel. The movement of the CBR of Italy from 
2009 reflects this relationship shift.  
    Figure 3-2 describes the situation of the other two PIIGS countries: Spain and 
Ireland. In both countries, the position of CB as a source of credit supply is quite 
insubstantial. Most of CBR changes are affected by net BLVC. An interesting point 
is that the BL change of Ireland has stayed positive except for three periods (Q2 
2009, Q3 2010, and Q4 2010) after the beginning of the global financial crisis (Q3 
2007). Distinguished from Ireland and Spain, it shows that the minus net volume 
change of BL has been continuing since Q1 2009.   




Figure 3-2. PIIGS Europe Group (2): Spain (G4), Ireland (G4) 
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    In Figure 4, there are CBR, BLVC, and CBVC of countries in the Other 
Europe Group. Since these countries have been less affected by the financial and 
sovereign debt crisis compared to the countries in the Core and PIIGS Group, it 
seems that the BL channel in each country is expanded from the beginning of 2000 
to around 2008. There are, nevertheless, comparatively larger losses of credits 
supplied by banking sector between 2008 and 2009. That is why a big sunken 
shaped area is found in CBR graph of each country. Except Netherlands, the size of 
minus level BLVC in after the financial crisis periods is unprecedented. Although 
this credit constraint between 2008 and 2009 may be caused by the European 
sovereign debt crisis, it is not sure whether the CB will play a more important role 
in supplying the credit. The reason is that the BL channel seems to regain features 
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Figure 4. Other Europe Group: Finland (G2), Netherlands (G2), Sweden (G2), Norway (G3) 
 
2.2.3. Asia – Pacific Group 
 
    Data of countries in Asia – Pacific Group are described in Figure 5-1 and 
Figure 5-2. The former consists of countries in G2, and the latter contains countries 
in G4.  
    According to Figure 5-1, the CB channel of Republic of Korea as a credit 
supplier consistently contracts from 2004 and 2007. This trend, by the way, has 
shifted from 2008; the CB becomes more significant as an alternative credit source. 
This shifting pattern, however, may be somewhat obscured to assess that the BL is 
substituted with CB. Although average size of the net BLVC becomes relatively 
smaller from Q4 2008 compared to the size between Q1 2007 to Q3 2008, this still 
remains on the positive side. That is, it may be reasonable to comment that 
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16 
volume from the CB channel increases more largely than that from BL channel. 
Meanwhile, the case of Thailand shows much more obvious substitution 
relationship between BL and CB during the most of the review period. In addition, 
the direction of substitution between BL and CB is shifted cyclically. This means 
that in Thailand, it is difficult to judge whether the shock of the financial crisis 





Figure 5-1. Asia – Pacific Group (1): Republic of Korea (G2), Thailand (G2)  
 
    According to Figure 5-2, although the average ratio of CB volume among 
total credit of Japan is under 20%, the substitution between the BL and the CB is 
presented distinctively in all periods. The noticeable point is that the size of the 
BLVC and CBVC becomes drastically smaller compared to the periods before Q2 
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to Q4 2010. However, overall size gap between the BLVC and the CBVC is too big 
to offset. The case of Hong Kong seems to be too much affected by the data source 
that BL includes all credit supply to private sectors. Compared to the BLVC, 
CBVC is so little that it is almost impossible to measure the substitution between 
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    To conclude, only with outstanding volume change data analysis, it is difficult 
to judge that the strengthening substitution relationship between the BL and the CB 
after the financial crisis similar to US case is general in every sample countries. 
However, it may be reasonable to explain that CB has made up the loss of BL in 
several countries such as France, United Kingdom, Italy, Finland, Sweden, 
Netherlands, and Republic of Korea since 2007 and 2008, which may illustrate that 
CB is substituted for BL weakly.  
 
 
2.3. Closer Look through Cross-Correlation Estimation, Multivariate  
    Regression, and Granger Causality Test   
 
    In this section, to understand the relationship between BL and CB more 
specifically, the coefficients of cross-correlation between each variable are 
provided first. Second, regression models benchmarked from De Bondt, Maddaloni, 
Peydró, and Scopel (2010) are suggested and their results are analyzed. Third, the 
relationship between each financing channel is analyzed through Granger Causality 
Tests. All terms – BL, CB – are growth rate basis. To observe the effects of the 
financial crisis on each relationship, the periods of review are divided with before 
and after the financial crisis cases as follows:8 
 
Before the Financial Crisis: Q2 2000 ~ Q2 20079 




                                          
8 It may be true that the effects of the recent financial crisis have started in earnest since Q3 2008,  
when Lehman Brothers went into bankruptcy. The period, Q3 2007, designated in this paper, is the  
time when the subprime mortgage crisis became severe. The reason why I choose the “Q3 2007” as  
the beginning of the financial crisis is that the number of data is too small to do econometric  
analyses if “Q3 2008” is set for the start of the financial crisis. In addition, Adrian, Colla, and Shin  
(2012) also chooses “Q3 2007” as the beginning of the financial crisis for its analyses. 
9 The reason why the beginning quarter of the period, “Before the Financial Crisis”, is Q2 2000 is  
  that it is necessary to have the outstanding data of Q4 1999 to calculate growth rates of Q1 2000.  
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2.3.1. Cross - Correlation Estimation 
    
    Before the further expansion, it is necessary to define the coefficient of cross-























    Table 3 shows the leading and lagging relationships between each variable. It 
is conventional that the largest positive (not absolute) value of correlation 
coefficient of  judges the leading and lagging relationship. “  ” sign between 
:  relationship means  leads  with  periods. “ – ” sign denotes vice versa. 
For instance, “+2 (0.5)” describes that  moves two period earlier than	 , and the 
correlation coefficient between	 	and 	is 0.5. For the criteria of correlation 
coefficients in terms of each period, it is assumed that leading and lagging eight 
quarters (as same as two years) guarantee the availability of the cross-correlation 
coefficients. Overall, the BL growth rate leads the CB growth rate before the 
financial crisis. After the financial crisis, the CB growth rate moves earlier than the 
BL growth rate in the additional four countries – US, Thailand, Japan, Brazil, Hong 
Kong, and Spain –, where the BL growth rate leads the CB growth rate before the 
financial crisis period. This shift, however, seems to be not dominant but just a 
partial phenomenon among the sample countries. In the meantime, GDP growth 
rates move simultaneously or prior to the growth rates of BL and CB before the 
crisis period. After the crisis, it is difficult to report that there exists a sudden 
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Table 3.  Leading and Lagging Relationship through Cross-Correlation 
 : This indicates the lead and lag relationships between each variable, which 
are statistically significant. “ – ” describes that a variable in the left side is 
lagging compared to one in the right side. “ + ” illustrates that a variable in 




However, the information provided in Table 3 only considers the positive values of 
correlation coefficients to prove the leading and lagging relationship. Table 4 
shows the period  when the largest absolute value of correlation coefficient is 
recorded.10 In the case of BL:CB, the largest absolute values of the correlation 
coefficients change from the positive side to negative side in countries such as 
France, Finland, Sweden, Thailand, Mexico, Norway, Australia, Brazil, and Ireland 
after the financial crisis. This correlation shift, nonetheless, may support that the 
degree of substitution between two financing channels is comparatively stronger 
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10 It is noted that  is not the object of analysis for the leading and lagging relationship in Table 4. 
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Table 4.  Cross-Correlation (The Largest Absolute Value) 
 
    That is, regardless of the leading and lagging relationship between BL and CB, 
it is reasonable to state that the level of substitution between the BL growth rate 
and the CB growth rate might become higher after the financial crisis regarding the 
results of the cross-correlation analyses. 
 
2.3.2. Regression Analysis 
 
    In this section, the regression models, which benchmark the regression model 
of De Bondt, Maddaloni, Peydró, and Scopel (2010), are implemented. De Bondt, 
Maddaloni, Peydró, and Scopel (2010) builds a panel regression model to measure 
the effects of financial and macroeconomic variables on the BL growth rate of 12 
eurozone countries. The authors set the BL growth rate as a dependent variable and 
BL growth rate with lag one, 15 BLS11 variables, and nine macroeconomic and 
financial variables as independent variables. Applying this model, the following 
benchmarked regression models are constructed: 
 
                                          
11 BLS stands for “Bank Lending Survey.” This is a survey which is supervised by the European  
   Central Bank to check the financing conditions of eurozone countries. More detailed information  
   is provided in De Bondt, Maddaloni, Peydró, and Scopel (2010) and <http://www.ecb.int/stats 




Model	II: 			where	 0, 1
 
 
where		 : 	 	 	 , : 	 	 12 
 
The GBY means the government bond yield rate of each country. The reason why 
this data set is included because the corporate bond yield rate data of all 20 sample 
countries are difficult to obtain. Furthermore, according to Duffee (1998), there is a 
(negative) correlation between treasury yields and spreads of corporate bond yields. 
The bank lending rate is the simple average of bank lending interest rates to private 
sectors. In De Bondt, Maddaloni, Peydró, and Scopel (2010), the lag term	 	is from 
zero to four. However, regarding the number data,	  of this paper is set from zero 
to one. 
    Table 5 and Table 6 provide the coefficients of the independent variables of 
Model I when 0. Compared between the results during before and after the 
financial crisis, the degree of substitution between the BL and CB growth rates 
becomes stronger more than half of countries. The results are presented similarly in 
Model II and the cases of each regression model when 1. The former is 
described in Table 7 and Table 8. Also, others are informed from Table A2 to Table 










                                          
12 International Financial Statistics (August 2012) 
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Regression Model: Q2 2000 ~ Q2 2007  
 
Country 
	1       
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value 
G1 United States - 0.072  - 0.889**  - 1.845** 0.836 1.124** 3.761  0.628 0.544 
  0.712  0.004  0.026 0.191 0.001 0.178  
France 0.350***  0.092  15.482 3.198** - 15.499 - 0.580  0.479 0.361 
  0.060  0.456  0.887 0.004 0.887 0.819  
G2 Greece - 0.070  0.438  - 245.435 - 2.630 250.725 - 25.355  0.329 0.024 
   0.825  0.142  0.652 0.244 0.645 0.152  
Republic of Korea - 0.105  0.002  1.529 - 0.275 2.121 - 16.468  0.491 0.321 
  0.644  0.975  0.211 0.677 0.278 0.102  
Finland 0.327***  0.200  - 424.857*** 1.498 425.928*** - 3.913  0.317 0.162 
  0.099  0.358  0.096 0.247 0.095 0.478  
Netherlands - 0.073  - 0.024  - 376.040** 4.094** 376.774** - 3.740  0.392 0.254 
  0.710  0.804  0.034 0.010 0.034 0.452  
Sweden - 0.137  0.081  - 7.047** - 1.094 5.896** 8.483**  0.599 0.508 
  0.524  0.319  0.002 0.245 0.013 0.012  
United Kingdom - 0.226  - 0.037  - 3.605** 0.195 1.741** 12.308**  0.363 0.219 
  0.335  0.807  0.011 0.822 0.013 0.036  
Thailand - 0.278  0.040  0.238 - 0.009  - 2.424** 15.269**  0.292 0.131 
  0.180  0.770  0.778 0.991 0.013 0.021  
G3 Mexico 0.159  - 0.104  - 1.014 0.548 0.316 8.172  0.277 0.112 
  0.468  0.581  0.254 0.600 0.561 0.131  
Norway - 0.044  0.158**  5.547** 0.285 - 7.137** 11.320**  0.828 0.789 
  0.800  0.001  0.000 0.166 0.000 0.000  
Portugal 0.257  0.022  - 109.728 0.067 110.866 - 3.698  0.506 0.394 
  0.223  0.629  0.187 0.850 0.183 0.087  
Italy 0.127  0.013  - 7.050 1.117*** 7.137 0.752  0.227 0.051 
  0.536  0.717  0.387 0.057 0.382 0.662  
G4 Japan 0.428**  - 0.019  0.888** - 0.081 - 1.454 1.072  0.712 0.647 
  0.022  0.814  0.013 0.562 0.163 0.529  
Australia - 0.054  - 0.101  0.335 0.690 1.016 - 8.492  0.079 -0.130 
  0.815  0.453  0.837 0.459 0.299 0.537  
Germany - 0.324  0.048**  57.721 0.591** - 57.732 - 0.127  0.368 0.224 
  0.103  0.032  0.268 0.031 0.268 0.899  
Brazil - 0.412**  0.076  0.140 0.840  - 0.260 16.495**  0.476 0.357 
  0.028  0.148  0.687 0.200 0.106 0.003  
Hong Kong 0.457**  - 0.071  -1.431*** - 0.004 1.696*** - 6.766  0.416 0.283 
  0.014  0.485  0.100 0.991 0.078 0.106  
Spain - 0.486  - 0.330  - 573.144 5.221 570.076*** 15.952  0.454 0.180 
  0.117  0.313  0.099*** 0.231 0.100 0.207  
Ireland 0.122  0.072  26.773 0.249 - 29.531 12.917  0.198 - 0.088 
  0.664  0.415  0.337 0.696 0.300 0.292  
** 5% Significance Level, *** 10% Significance Level 
 
Table 5. Multivariate Regression Model I when  
 ∎ Dependent Variable : 












Regression Model: Q3 2007 ~ Q4 2011 
 
Country 
	1       
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value 
G1 United States 0.429  - 0.423  -1.300 0.431 0.845 0.956  0.565  0.367  
  0.312  0.670  0.566 0.570 0.577 0.847    
France 0.599**  - 0.400**  22.927 1.260** - 21.671 - 3.357  0.786  0.689  
  0.003  0.008  0.788 0.016 0.799 0.175    
G2 Greece - 0.207  - 0.016  - 1397.249*** 3.626 1397.454*** 0.752  0.371  - 0.022  
  0.508  0.814  0.071 0.141 0.071 0.872    
Republic of Korea 0.005**  0.007   - 0.016 0.004 0.044** - 0.180**  0.894  0.845  
  0.019  0.800  0.117 0.115 0.004 0.001    
Finland 0.596**  - 0.165  110.608 0.341 - 109.723 - 2.355  0.726  0.601  
  0.007  0.206  0.347 0.196 0.350 0.450    
Netherlands 0.017  - 0.140  - 64.743 1.126 65.677 - 0.678  0.315  0.003  
  0.962  0.541  0.832 0.230 0.829 0.874    
Sweden 0.554**  0.178  2.254 0.932 0.326  - 9.542  0.665  0.512  
  0.045  0.276  0.245 0.109 0.528 0.269    
United Kingdom 0.248  - 0.021  - 0.560 0.235 0.845*** 0.400  0.747  0.632  
  0.389  0.857  0.494 0.677 0.063 0.885    
Thailand - 0.160  - 0.344  - 0.823 - 0.025 2.797 - 12.666  0.409  0.140  
  0.671  0.238  0.697 0.944 0.341 0.329    
G3 Mexico 0.405**  0.184**  - 2.696** 0.789** 1.549** 10.090**  0.793  0.689  
  0.016  0.042  0.010 0.012 0.015 0.024    
Norway 0.700**  - 0.244  1.182 0.792***  - 0.926 0.335  0.730  0.607  
  0.012  0.168  0.605 0.098 0.751 0.938    
Portugal 0.465  - 0.088  74.019 0.482 - 74.203 1.584  0.373  0.088  
  0.181  0.488  0.607 0.532 0.606 0.309    
Italy 0.453  -0.030  1.304 0.079 - 2.055 3.809  0.225  - 0.128  
  0.179  0.811  0.994 0.889 0.990 0.357    
G4 Japan 0.091  - 0.054  - 1.334 - 0.148 2.236 - 2.071  0.465  0.221  
  0.734  0.412  0.466 0.159 0.265 0.309    
Australia 0.613**  0.222  - 0.019 - 0.057 0.586 - 4.301  0.689  0.548  
  0.028  0.438  0.983 0.949 0.431 0.380    
Germany 0.270  0.019  82.106 - 0.103 - 81.862 - 0.506  0.364  0.075  
  0.492  0.712  0.321 0.579 0.321 0.620    
Brazil 0.473  - 0.007  0.535 0.298 - 0.138 2.181  0.746  0.631  
  0.167  0.882  0.168 0.275 0.296 0.688    
Hong Kong 0.502**  - 0.234  2.346 1.021** - 6.144** 31.908**  0.723  0.597  
  0.011  0.329  0.337 0.008 0.038 0.029    
Spain - 0.120  - 0.170  - 539.417 - 0.180 538.466 5.365  0.299  - 0.019  
  0.607  0.361  0.110 0.931 0.110 0.552    
Ireland - 0.239  - 0.082  4.991** - 0.194 - 5.100** 4.051  0.552  0.348  
  0.295  0.267  0.033 0.746 0.028 0.142    
** 5% Significance Level, *** 10% Significance Level 
 
Table 6. Multivariate Regression Model I when  
 ∎ Dependent Variable : 












Regression Model: Q2 2000 ~ Q2 2007 
 
Country 
	1       
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value 
G1 United States 0.425**  - 0.299**  -0.662 0.026 0.469** 1.405  0.624  0.539  
  0.022  0.011  0.196 0.945 0.004 0.420    
France 0.496**  0.297  104.912 - 1.588 - 104.268 - 1.614  0.444  0.318  
  0.012  0.340  0.543 0.401 0.545 0.697    
G2 Greece 1.000**  0.000  0.000** 0.000 0.000** 1.000**  1.000  1.000  
  0.000  0.610  0.005 0.998 0.005 0.000    
Republic of Korea - 0.262  0.249  -1.632 4.011 9.043 - 53.506  0.193  - 0.095  
  0.339  0.862  0.804 0.233 0.326 0.227    
Finland - 0.218  0.313  43.350 - 1.651 - 42.088 - 1.868  0.231  0.057  
  0.349  0.135  0.872 0.184 0.876 0.731    
Netherlands 0.568**  - 0.673  -118.549 3.775 119.083 - 3.223  0.510  0.399  
  0.002  0.126  0.736 0.223 0.735 0.759    
Sweden - 0.018  0.509  -8.461 - 1.408 11.227*** - 9.746  0.413  0.280  
  0.934  0.403  0.144 0.548 0.053 0.330    
United Kingdom - 0.012  - 0.041  - 1.008 0.340 1.588  - 1.629  0.168  - 0.021  
  0.947  0.893  0.551 0.785 0.114 0.830    
Thailand - 0.005  0.086  2.225 0.045 - 1.080 -2.628  0.145  - 0.050  
  0.984  0.793  0.143 0.974 0.460 0.811    
G3 Mexico - 0.223  - 0.136  0.014 1.821 - 0.309 4.448  0.269  0.102  
  0.203  0.560  0.988 0.112 0.597 0.442    
Norway - 0.107  2.379**  - 10.966** - 0.797 14.012** - 21.288**  0.418  0.286  
  0.541  0.002  0.026 0.336 0.026 0.032    
Portugal - 0.336  0.731  256.901 - 0.290 - 259.255 13.560  0.156   - 0.036  
  0.123  0.436  0.492 0.858 0.489 0.153    
Italy - 0.066  0.435  46.843 - 5.601 - 38.715 - 27.555**  0.509  0.398  
  0.758  0.735  0.334 0.109 0.426 0.014    
G4 Japan - 0.205  0.574  - 0.815 0.194 9.183** - 14.672**  0.438  0.311  
  0.318  0.292  0.453 0.625 0.001 0.002    
Australia 0.158  - 0.291  3.596 - 0.519 1.932 - 34.482***  0.222  0.046  
  0.419  0.390  0.149 0.725 0.176 0.093    
Germany 0.141  2.586  - 340.142 - 2.909 344.150 - 12.190  0.426  0.296  
  0.516  0.243  0.469  0.247 0.464 0.206    
Brazil 0.305  1.768**  - 0.681 - 1.377 0.407 - 15.165  0.270  0.104  
  0.162  0.021  0.626 0.588 0.531 0.447    
Hong Kong - 0.041  - 0.431  1.414 - 0.197 - 1.085 6.506  0.137  - 0.059  
  0.841  0.274  0.455 0.776 0.609  0.487    
Spain - 0.117  - 0.062  277.207 3.350 - 273.900 - 14.980  0.225  - 0.127  
  0.697  0.835  0.442 0.481 0.446 0.269    
Ireland - 0.065  0.717  49.676 - 0.092 - 52.881 12.340  0.118  - 0.175  
  0.776  0.428  0.560 0.962 0.553 0.734    
** 5% Significance Level, *** 10% Significance Level 
 
Table 7. Multivariate Regression Model II when  
 ∎ Dependent Variable :  











Regression Model: Q3 2007 ~ Q4 2011 
 
Country 
	1       
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value 
G1 United States - 0.300  - 0.078  - 0.569 0.225 0.162 3.792**  0.246  - 0.097  
  0.301  0.383  0.269 0.346 0.563 0.012    
France - 0.352  - 0.812**  140.093 0.870 - 138.511 - 1.854  0.499  0.272  
  0.115  0.021  0.356 0.312 0.362 0.689    
G2 Greece - 0.324  - 0.436  - 1162.051 5.659 1156.728 29.616  0.263  - 0.198  
  0.450  0.817  0.794 0.678 0.795 0.306    
Republic of Korea - 0.305  - 0.548  0.051 - 0.016  - 0.058 0.229  0.102  - 0.307  
  0.402  0.844  0.650 0.656 0.761 0.761    
Finland - 0.001  - 0.854  51.315 - 0.781 - 53.277 9.612  0.567  0.371  
  0.998  0.237  0.843 0.240 0.836 0.141    
Netherlands - 0.314  - 0.276  558.921 - 2.208 - 559.765 7.831  0.427  0.167  
  0.239  0.507  0.159 0.123 0.159 0.214    
Sweden - 0.095  0.217  2.362 - 1.341 1.231 - 12.525  0.361  0.070  
  0.777  0.678  0.579 0.161 0.283 0.513    
United Kingdom - 0.384  0.501  0.353 - 4.389** - 0.286 1.778  0.583  0.393  
  0.248  0.596  0.864 0.017 0.820 0.796    
Thailand 0.012  - 0.506  - 0.185 - 0.117 0.154 1.966  0.230  - 0.120  
  0.968  0.125  0.925 0.740 0.949 0.866    
G3 Mexico 0.263  1.245***  8.428** - 1.795*** - 5.087** - 28.279  0.637  0.456  
  0.332  0.094  0.019 0.097 0.013 0.107    
Norway - 0.108  - 0.204  - 2.201 0.050 2.694 - 1.154  0.107  - 0.298  
  0.782  0.645  0.619 0.945 0.635 0.887    
Portugal - 0.269  - 0.018  - 8.881 1.719 8.820 3.096  0.115  - 0.287  
  0.452  0.981  0.980 0.379 0.980 0.389    
Italy 0.067  - 0.297  - 661.775 - 2.143 660.148 9.224  0.483  0.247  
  0.911  0.787  0.151 0.430 0.152 0.503    
G4 Japan - 0.306  - 1.237  - 12.466 0.138 4.944 6.504  0.422  0.159  
  0.268  0.352  0.109 0.782 0.566 0.453    
Australia 0.212  - 0.236  - 0.331 1.095 1.038 - 5.785  0.251  - 0.089  
  0.540  0.541  0.841 0.393 0.352 0.410    
Germany - 0.018  1.039  624.838 - 0.653 - 621.243 - 8.163  0.481  0.245  
  0.968  0.582  0.201 0.689 0.203 0.192    
Brazil - 0.432  - 2.711  2.987 - 3.325 - 1.902*** 70.880***  0.339  0.039  
  0.219  0.185  0.185 0.126 0.060 0.087    
Hong Kong - 0.439  - 0.195  - 4.052 0.760*** 2.334 - 8.566  0.456  0.209  
  0.084  0.446  0.156 0.094 0.510 0.627    
Spain - 0.078  - 0.522  - 718.383 3.979 717.337 6.959  0.288  - 0.035  
  0.814  0.322  0.280 0.236 0.280 0.636    
Ireland - 0.039  - 1.970***  3.886 - 4.240*** - 4.995 18.039  0.489  0.256  
  0.857  0.093  0.720 0.062 0.642 0.120    
** 5% Significance Level, *** 10% Significance Level 
 
Table 8. Multivariate Regression Model II when  
 ∎ Dependent Variable :  
 ∎ Independent Variable : , , , ,  
 
 
    However, a critical problem is that most of the coefficients are statistically 
insignificant neither under 95% confidence level nor under 90% confidence level. 
To manage this problem, two diagnostic analyses are suggested in the following 
two sections.  
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2.3.2.1. Multicollinearity Tests 
 
    In this section, the multicollinearity tests are implemented in every model and 
every . To judge the existence of multicollinearity, variance inflation factor (VIF) 
is calculated. As a conventional rule of thumb, if VIF of an independent variable  
is larger than 10, there is multicollinearity between	  and other independent 
variables. Table 9, Table 10, Table 11, and Table 12 show the results of the 
multicollinearity tests of Model I ( 0) and Model II ( 0). That is, in more 
than half of the sample countries, there exists multicollinearity in the bank lending 
interest rate ( ) and the government bond yield rate ( ) with other independent 
variables. This is almost similar to the cases of Model I ( 1) and Model II 
( 1). The results are described in Table A5, Table A6, Table A7, and Table A8 in 
Appendix II.   
 
Q2 2000 ~ Q2 2007 
 Country 	1     
G1 United States 
France √ √ 
G2 Greece √ √ 
Republic of Korea 
Finland √ √ 
Netherlands √ √ 




Norway √ √ 
Portugal √ √ 
Italy √ √ 
G4 Japan 
Australia 
Germany √ √ 
Brazil 
Hong Kong √ 
Spain 
Ireland √ √ 
 
Table 9. Multicollinearity Test (Model I when )  
 
: Independent variables having “√” indicates that there 
exists multicollinearity with other ones. This is judged if 






Q3 2007 ~ Q4 2011 
 Country 	1     
G1 United States 
France √ √ 
G2 Greece 
Republic of Korea √ √ 
Finland √ √ 




G3 Mexico √ 
Norway √ √ 
Portugal √ √ 
Italy √ √ 
G4 Japan 
Australia 
Germany √ √ 
Brazil 
Hong Kong √ √ 
Spain √ √ 
Ireland √ √ 
 
Table 10. Multicollinearity Test (Model I when )  
 
: Independent variables having “√” indicates that there 
exists multicollinearity with other ones. This is judged if 
variance inflation factor (VIF) is larger than 10. 
 
Q2 2000 ~ Q2 2007 
 Country 	 	1     
G1 United States 
France √ √ 
G2 Greece √ √ 
Republic of Korea 
Finland √ √ 
Netherlands √ √ 




Norway √ √ 
Portugal √ √ 
Italy √ √ 
G4 Japan 
Australia 
Germany √ √ 
Brazil 
Hong Kong √ 
Spain 
Ireland √ √ 
 
Table 11. Multicollinearity Test (Model II when )  
 
: Independent variables having “√” indicates that there 
exists multicollinearity with other ones. This is judged if 
variance inflation factor (VIF) is larger than 10. 
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Q3 2007 ~ Q4 2011 
 Country 	 	1     
G1 United States 
France √ √ 
G2 Greece 
Republic of Korea √ √ 
Finland √ √ 




G3 Mexico √ 
Norway √ √ 
Portugal √ √ 
Italy √ √ 
G4 Japan 
Australia 
Germany √ √ 
Brazil 
Hong Kong √ √ 
Spain √ √ 
Ireland √ √ 
 
Table 12 Multicollinearity Test (Model II when ) 
 
: Independent variables having “√” indicates that there 
exists multicollinearity with other ones. This is judged if 
variance inflation factor (VIF) is larger than 10. 
 
Although all of the following regression models are constructed to find a model 
which has more statistically significant coefficients, there is few case to clarify the 




















2.3.2.2. Checking Correlation Coefficients and  
       Estimating Correlation Coefficients of the Modified Regression Model 
 
    This paper focuses on the substitution relationship between BL and CB. Thus, 
although there exist multicollinearity among independent variables except the 
financing channel variables, there is no problem that the P-value of the coefficients 
of the		 	and		  become valid factors for testing the significance of these 
predictive coefficients (of the two financing channels). Based on this convention, 
first, the correlation coefficients among independent variables in Model I and 
Model II are calculated. In addition, to choose the relatively larger correlation 
coefficients under the absolute value criteria, 10% significance level is set as a 
standard of significance judgment.13  
 
Modified Model I  (Dependent Variable: ) Modified Model II  (Dependent Variable: ) 
Independent Variable:  Independent Variable:  









P-value P-value P-value P-value 
Sweden 0.21** Finland - 0.38** France 0.70*** Finland - 1.44** 
 (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.056)  (0.014) 
  Thailand - 0.47***     
   (0.083)     
Modified Model I  (Dependent Variable: ) Modified Model II  (Dependent Variable: ) 
Independent Variable:  Independent Variable:  









P-value P-value P-value P-value 
Finland 0.41*** Finland - 0.33** France 0.74** Netherlands - 0.94** 
 (0.061)  (0.014)  (0.042)  (0.025) 
  UK 0.33*** Sweden 1.43**   
   (0.065)  (0.003)   
** 5% Significance Level, *** 10% Significance Level 
 
Table 13. Predictive Coefficients of  and  of the Selected Sample Countries 
 
Second, using the results of the first step, the Modified (Regression) Model I and II 
excluding the independent variables having relatively higher level of correlation 
with  and  from Model I and Model II are constructed for every sample 
                                          
13 The most of significant correlation coefficients are higher than 0.35 with absolute value term. Also,  
   they are relatively larger than other coefficients. 
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country and period. Table 13 provides the pieces of information that the predictive 
coefficients of  and  become shifted from insignificant one to 
significant one after the regression model adjustment. It is true that predictive 
coefficients of  and 	 become significant when the independent 
variables having relatively high level of correlation with  or  are not 
included in Model I or Model II (in one or two sample countries). However, as 
regarding the situation that the number of samples having significant coefficients 
either in  or  is still too small to judge whether the degree of 
substitution between two credit financing channels becomes higher or not.  
 
    As a result, the multivariate regression analyses implemented in this section 
do not provide any valid and meaningful pieces of evidence to judge neither 
whether there exist a substitution relationship between BL and CB nor whether the 





























2.3.3. Granger Causality Test: BL Growth Rate and CB Growth Rate 
 
    Table 14 illustrates the results of Granger Causality tests between BL growth 
rate and CB growth rate. According to the results of the Granger Causality tests, 
there is no common Granger Causality result between BL growth rate and CB 
growth rate of the sample countries. Since there exists a statistically significant 
Grange Causality only in 10 sample countries, it is difficult to find any evidence 
between two financing channels through this analysis.  
 
Granger Causality Test (Q2 2000 ~ Q4 2011) 
 Country 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
        
G1 France    **  **   
G2 Netherlands  ***      ** 
G3 Italy      **  ** 
G2 Republic of Korea **    ** ** ** ** 
G3 Norway **  ***      
Portugal       **  
G4 Brazil ***  **  ***  ***  
Germany **  **  **  **  
Ireland   ***      
Japan   ***      
G1 United States         
G2 Greece         
Finland         
Sweden         
Thailand         
United Kingdom         
G3 Mexico         
G4 Australia         
Hong Kong         
Spain         
** means  is rejected under 5% significance level., *** 10% means  is rejected under significance 10% level. 
 
Table 14. Granger Causality Test 
 ■ Bank Loan Growth Rate – Corporate Bond Growth Rate 
∶ Corporate Bond Growth Rate does not Granger Causes Bank Loan Growth Rate. 







2.4. Results and Discussion 
 
    Through the data analyses in Section 2, the following fact is derived. 
Compared with the situation before the financial crisis, the level of substitution 
between a bank lending channel and a corporate bond financing channel has risen 
after the financial crisis in many sample countries. The main sources of this shift 
can be explained with a couple of ways. First, as mentioned in Section 2.2, if the 
size of the bank financing channel decreases overwhelmingly after the financial 
crisis compared to the corporate finance channel, this may over-estimate the role of 
the corporate bond as a credit funding source. Second, the asymmetric information 
problem may be relevant to this trend shift. According to De Fiore and Uhlig 
(2012), the reason why the corporate bond market of the US is more developed 
than that of European countries is that investors can access to firm’s credit 
information more easily in the US. If firms of sample countries try to fund money 
through direct financing channels after the financial crisis because of the 
contraction of bank lending channel, they would provide more information about 
















3. Vector Autoregression (VAR) Model 
 
3.1. VAR Model 
 
    In this chapter, two types of VAR models are constructed to identify the 
impulse-response relationship among variables. Since the periods of data are 
distinguished between “Before the Financial Crisis” and “After the Financial Crisis” 
as well as Section 2.3, there happens a problem of the small number of time 
periods.14 Regarding this, all lags in each VAR model is set to one. Under this 
circumstance, the model consists of GDP growth rate, BL growth rate, and CB 













where : GDP Growth Rate, : Bank Loan Growth Rate, : Corporate Bond Growth Rate 
 
The reason why  is put in the first order is that it is assumed that current 
financial shock does not affect current real economy. Thus, the models in this 
section assume that it needs time that shocks in the financing channel of the current 
period affect the real variables. With the above VAR, impulse-response functions 








                                          
14 The number of periods of “Before the Financial Crisis” and “After the Financial Crisis” is 29 and  
   18 respectively. 
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3.2. Impulse - Response Analysis 
 
    For Model III, Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 describe the impulse - 
response relationships of the selected sample countries. Figure 6-1, Figure 7-1, and 
Figure 8-1 illustrate the impulse – response of the before the financial crisis cases. 
Moreover, Figure 6-2, Figure 7-2, and Figure 8-2 show the impulse – response of 
the after the financial crisis cases. Depending on the countries or variables, a trend 
of each impulse – response seems to be different. This section focus on how the 
direction of response to shock changes comparing between before and after the 
financial crisis. For the reference, all of the impulse – response diagrams for Model 
































Q2 2000 ~ Q2 2007 
 
Response of BL to CB Response of CB to BL 
 
Response of BL to GDP Response of CB to GDP 
  
Figure 6-1. US: Impulse – Response Relationship  
 
Q3 2007 ~ Q4 2011 
 
Response of BL to CB Response of CB to BL 
 
Response of BL to GDP Response of CB to GDP 
  
Figure 6-2. US: Impulse – Response Relationship  
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Q2 2000 ~ Q2 2007 
 
Response of BL to CB Response of CB to BL 
 
Response of BL to GDP Response of CB to GDP 
 
Figure 7-1. Republic of Korea: Impulse – Response Relationship  
 
Q3 2007 ~ Q4 2011 
 
Response of BL to CB Response of CB to BL 
 
Response of BL to GDP Response of CB to GDP 
 
Figure 7-2. Republic of Korea: Impulse – Response Relationship  
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Q2 2000 ~ Q2 2007 
 
Response of BL to CB Response of CB to BL 
 
Response of BL to GDP Response of CB to GDP 
 
Figure 8-1. Portugal: Impulse – Response Relationship  
 
Q3 2007 ~ Q4 2011 
 
Response of BL to CB Response of CB to BL 
 
Response of BL to GDP Response of CB to GDP 
 
Figure 8-2. Portugal: Impulse – Response Relationship  
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    Table 15 shows the results of impulse – response relationship of Model III. 
“ : ” indicates the “Response of  to .” In addition, BC and AC mean “Before 
the Financial Crisis” and “After the Financial Crisis” respectively. “+” sign denotes 
that when there is a shock on ,  responses to the same side with the shock on 
. “–” describes that  responses to the opposite side with the shock on . 
Regarding BL:CB and CB:BL, the complement relationship between BL and CB is 
shifted to substitution relationship only in seven to eight countries. In addition, this 
does not support the argument in Section 2 that the source of this shift is originated 
from BL channel. However, if the real variable shock is conditioned, the 
substitution relationship between BL and CB is more clearly indentified. This is 
estimated by BL:GDP and CB:GDP. More than half of the sample countries, BL is 
procyclical with GDP both before and after the financial crisis periods. CB shows, 
nonetheless, counter-cyclicality with GDP in 12 countries before the financial crisis 
and 10 countries after the financial crisis.15 Although it is ambiguous to judge 
whether the degree of counter-cyclicality becomes stronger or not since the 
financial crisis, it is justifiable that the CB channel is more counter-cyclical than 
the BL channel to GDP. This may be explained by the fact that firms prefer to 
being financed through the BL channel to being funded through the CB channel 
when macroeconomy is not under recession. When there exist financial shocks and 
economy goes into a recession, the intermediated financing channel would become 
illiquid. Then, the direct financing channels would become alternative sources of 
credit to firms.  






                                          
15 If a response function is converged to zero with oscillation, it is premised that the largest absolute  
   value represents cyclicality property.  
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Impulse-Response Analysis: Model III 
 
Country 
BL:CB CB:BL BL:GDP CB:GDP 
BC AC BC AC BC AC BC AC 
G1 United States - - - + + - + - + - + - 
France + + - + - + + - - + - 
G2 Greece NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Republic of 
Korea 
+ - + + - + - + + - + - 
Finland + - + - + + - + - 
Netherlands +  - + - + + - + - 
Sweden + - + + - + - + - + 
United Kingdom + + + + + + + - 
Thailand - + + - + + - + - + - 
G3 Mexico -  + - + + + + - + 
Norway - - + - + - + - + 
Portugal + + + - - + - + + - + + - 
Italy - - + - + - + - + - 
G4 Japan - - - - + - - + - + - + - + 
Australia + - - + + - + + - + - 
Germany + + + + + - - - + 
Brazil - - + - + - - + + + - - + - 
Hong Kong - - + - - + + + - + - 
Spain + - - + + + - + + - + + 
Ireland + - + - + 
- + - 
+ 
- + +  - + - 
BC: Q2 2000 ~ Q3 2007,  AC: Q3 2007 ~ Q4 2011 
      
Table 15. Impulse-Response Function – GDP, BL, CB Growth Rates
: “ : ” indicates the “Response of  to .” In addition, BC and AC mean 
“Before the Financial Crisis” and “After the Financial Crisis” respectively. “+” 
sign indicates that when there is a shock on ,  responses to same direction. “–
” describes the vice versa. 
: Greece case is derived as near singular matrix by Eviews 7.0.
 
    Table 16 describes the results of the impulse – response relationship of Model 
IV. The shaded area indicates the different characteristics compared to Table 15. 
There is little difference between two models. 
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Impulse-Response Analysis: Model IV 
 
Country 
BL:CB CB:BL BL:GDP CB:GDP 
BC AC BC AC BC AC BC AC 
G1 United States - - - + + - + - + - + - 
France + - + + - + + - - + - 
G2 Greece NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Republic of 
Korea 
+ - + + - + - + + - + - 
Finland + - + - + + - + - 
Netherlands +  - + - + + - + - 
Sweden + - + + - + - + - + 
United Kingdom + + + + + + + - 
Thailand - + + - + + - + - + - 
G3 Mexico -  + - + + + + - + 
Norway - - + + + - + - + 
Portugal + + + - - + - + + - + + - 
Italy - - + - + - + - + - 
G4 Japan - -  - + - - + - + - + - + 
Australia + - - + + - + + - + - 
Germany + + + + + - - - + 
Brazil - - + - + - - + + + - - + - 
Hong Kong - - + - - + + + - + - 
Spain + - - + + + - + + - + + 
Ireland + - + - + 
- + - 
+ 
- + +  - + - 
BC: Q2 2000 ~ Q3 2007,  AC: Q3 2007 ~ Q4 2011 
      
Table 16. Impulse-Response Function - GDP, CB, BL Growth Rates 
: “ : ” indicates the “Response of  to .” In addition, BC and AC mean 
“Before the Financial Crisis” and “After the Financial Crisis” respectively. “+” 
sign indicates that when there is a shock on ,  responses to same direction. “–
” describes the vice versa. 
: Greece case is derived as near singular matrix by Eviews 7.0. 
: The shaded areas mean that there is a difference in the Impulse-Response 
relationship compared to the results of Model III. In the “BL:CB” and “CB:BL” 
cases, differences in the current period 1 of Impluse-Response diagrams are 







    This paper contributes to elucidate that there exists a (weak) substitution 
relationship between a BL channel and a CB channel in multi-national level. In 
particular, this counter-cyclicality between the BL and the CB seems to be clearer 
under the GDP shock, which is described in the results of the impulse-response 
analyses through BL:GDP and CB:GDP.   
    As the limitation of this research, there are two representative points. First, 
regarding many literatures, to check several issues related to relationships between 
indirect financing channels and direct financing channels, spread variables such as 
corporate bond rates and bank lending interest rate should be included mainly in 
econometric analyses. Moreover, because of the commitment and non-commitment 
problems in bank loan, the cyclical properties of bank lending channels are difficult 
to confirm. These limitations are mainly caused by the lack of data sources. That is, 
it is difficult to select variables which are compiled with same standards and same 
periods. For the further studies, more micro (firm) level data sets of many countries 
are necessary to be surveyed. Second, this paper does not check the relationship 
between credit financing channels and real economy. To identify the role and 
effects of each financing channel and channel shift, it is helpful to apply Markov 
Regime Switching concept to VAR model without any period separation – Before 
the Financial Crisis, After the Financial Crisis – in data set. This will be done in 
future research.  
    In spite of the limitation of this research, two key results are i  higher level 
of substitution between BL and CB after the macroeconomic impact such as the 
recent financial crisis in many of sample countries, ii  the consistent counter-
cyclicality between CB channel and GDP growth rate both in before and after the 
financial crisis periods, which provide a policy implication. Thus, if CB markets 
are developed and controlled efficiently to minimize the detrimental effects caused 
by bond default risks, CB channel would play an important role in funding credits 
for firms when there is illiquidity in a bank financing channel. This portfolio 
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diversification would be helpful to relieve the deleterious effects lead by massive 
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APPENDIX I  Data Description 
 
∎	Corporate Bond Data 
[1] Source:  ▪ Bank for International Settlements – Statistics – Securities  
  <http://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm> 
▪ 금융감독원 금융통계정보시스템 자본시장통계,  
  11. 회사채 발행, 상환, 잔액 
(11. Issues, Redemptions and Outstanding Amounts of  
Corporate Bonds, Credit Market,Financial Statistics  
Information System, Financial Supervisory Service) 
  <http://fisis.fss.or.kr> 
  
[2] Period: Q1 2000 ~ Q4 2011 
  
[3] Data Type: Quarterly, Outstanding, Non-Seasonally Adjusted  
  
[4] Unit: Billions of US Dollar (Original) ⟹ Billions of Local Currency 
* Transforming Billions of Local Currency through exchange  
rates provided by International Financial Statistics Data 
  
[5] Method: Adding the following domestic debt securities (D)  
and international debt securities (F) 
 * (D) Corporate Issuers 16B. Financial Institutions and 
Corporate Issuers – 16. Domestic Debt Securities by Sector 
and Residence of Issuer  
* (F) 12C. (Non-Financial) Corporate Issuers –  
12. International Debt Securities by Nationality of Issuer 
 
∎	Bank Lending Data 
[1] Source: ▪ Thomson Reuters Datastream Advance 4.0  
▪ Republic of Korea: Bank of Korea,  
▪ United States: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System) 
  
[2] Period: Q1 2000 ~ Q4 2011 
  
[3] Data Type: Quarterly, Outstanding, Non-Seasonally Adjusted  
  
[4] Unit: Billions of Local Currency  
  
[5] Data Coverage of Each Country:  
 ▪ Australia: Australia Business Lending (Datastream Code: 440176488) 
 ▪ Brazil: Brazil Financial System Credit – Private Sector (Datastream Code: 802000562) 
 ▪ Finland: Finland Bank Lending Private Sector (Datastream Code: 450200044) 
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 ▪ France: France Lending by Banks to Non-Financial Corporations (Datastream Code: 689152962)  
 ▪ Germany: Germany Lending to Enterprises and Individuals (Datastream Code: 309844876) 
 ▪ Greece: Greece Bank Prime Lending to Non-Financial Corporations (Datastream Code: 388602200) 
 ▪ Hong Kong: Hong Kong Loans and Advances (Datastream Code: 482420129) 
 ▪ Ireland: Ireland Financial Balance Sheet, Non-Financial Corporations, Liabilities, Loans – Short-term, Long-term  
  (Datastream Code: 440503553, 440503554) 
 ▪ Italy: Italy Non-Financial Corporation Loans: Maturity Up to 1 Year, 1~5 Years, Over 5 Years 
  (Datastream Code: 316877185, 316877186, 316877187) 
 ▪ Japan: Japan Aggregate Bank Lending (Excl. Shinkin Banks) (Datastream Code: 497933382) 
 ▪ Mexico: Mexico Commercial Bank Credit to the Private Sector (Datastream Code: 518800966) 
 ▪ Netherlands: Netherlands Bank Lending to Non-Financial Corporations: Maturity Up to 1 Year, 1~5 Years,  
  Over 5 Years (Datastream Code: 440163813, 440163814, 440163815)  
 ▪ Norway: Norway Credit to Non-Financial Enterprises (Datastream Code: 343101919) 
 ▪ Portugal: Portugal MFI Loans to Non-Financial Corporations (Datastream Code: 595600751) 
 ▪ Republic of Korea: 한국은행 경제통계시스템, 3.3.2.1 총대출금(예금취급기관) 
                    (3.3.2.1 Loans & Discounts by Industry, Economic Statistics System, The Bank of Korea) 
 ▪ Spain: Spain MFI Loans to Non-Financial Corporations (Datastream Code: 424003721) 
 ▪ Sweden: Sweden Banks to Non-Financial Corporations (Datastream Code: 365440033) 
 ▪ Thailand: Thailand Commercial Banks Credits: Loan-Business (Datastream Code: 440434309) 
 ▪ United Kingdom: UK MFI’s: Loans: Private Non-Financial Corporations (Datastream Code: 15630790) 
 ▪ United States: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States 
 
∎	Real GDP Growth Rate 
[1] Source:  ▪ OECD StatExtracts 
▪ Hong Kong: Census and Statistics  
▪ Thailand: Office of the National Economic and  
          Social Development Board 
[2] Period: Q1 2000 ~ Q4 2011 
[3] Data Type: Change over Previous Quarter, Seasonally Adjusted 
[4] Unit: % 
 
 
∎	Government Bond Yield Rate and Bank Lending Interest Rate 
[1] Source: International Financial Statistics 
[2] Period: Q1 2000 ~ Q4 2011 













∎	Data Period Setting (Growth Rate Data) 
Country Start Finish 
Australia Q2 2000 Q4 2011 
Brazil Q2 2000 Q4 2011 
Finland Q2 2000 Q4 2011 
France Q2 2000 Q4 2011 
Germany Q2 2000 Q4 2011 
Greece Q1 2003 Q4 2011 
Hong Kong Q2 2000 Q4 2011 
Ireland Q2 2002 Q4 2011 
Italy Q2 2000 Q4 2011 
Japan Q2 2000 Q4 2011 
Republic of Korea Q2 2002 Q4 2011 
Mexico Q3 2003 Q4 2011 
Norway Q2 2000 Q4 2011 
Netherlands Q2 2000 Q4 2011 
Portugal Q2 2000 Q4 2011 
Spain Q2 2003 Q4 2011 
Sweden Q2 2000 Q4 2011 
Thailand Q2 2000 Q4 2011 
United Kingdom Q2 2000 Q4 2011 




















APPENDIX II  Coefficients of Regression Model 
 
Regression Model: Q2 2000 ~ Q2 2007 
 
Country 
	1  	1  1 1 1  
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value 
G1 United States - 0.009  - 0.718***  - 1.846*** 0.478 0.840** 5.383***  0.421  0.289  
  0.975  0.100  0.054 0.484 0.032 0.071    
France 0.413  0.094  46.557 0.454  - 47.219 3.380  0.271  0.105  
  0.103  0.492  0.712 0.753 0.708 0.257    
G2 Greece 0.000  0.362  - 162.642 0.964 163.633 - 9.688  0.161  -0.220  
  1.000  0.275  0.796 0.548 0.794 0.670    
Republic of Korea 0.421  0.057  0.796 0.060 0.150 - 2.907  0.462  0.270  
  0.219  0.309  0.535 0.933 0.937 0.733    
Finland 0.225  0.265  218.537 1.736 - 216.379 - 9.360 *** 0.339  0.189  
  0.248  0.234  0.411 0.165 0.415 0.090    
Netherlands 0.010  0.193**  - 4.957 0.540 2.263 12.474**  0.347  0.199  
  0.966  0.031  0.981 0.749 0.991 0.023    
Sweden - 0.435**  0.191**  - 8.232** - 0.064 6.561** 10.670**  0.646  0.565  
  0.038  0.018  0.000 0.930 0.003 0.002    
United Kingdom 0.033  - 0.005  - 1.767 - 0.044 0.958 6.586  0.163  -0.027  
  0.892  0.974  0.202 0.965 0.191 0.286    
Thailand - 0.333***  - 0.060  0.297 1.040 - 2.267** 12.884**  0.403  0.267  
  0.091  0.644  0.703 0.192 0.017 0.036    
G3 Mexico 0.098  - 0.050  - 1.636** 1.547*** 0.830*** 9.383**  0.482  0.364  
  0.587  0.739  0.019 0.091 0.073 0.014    
Norway 0.325  - 0.077  3.210*** - 0.333 - 4.599** 9.634**  0.713  0.647  
  0.247  0.281  0.067 0.209 0.041 0.008    
Portugal 0.428***  0.018  62.735*** 0.141 - 62.000*** - 2.220  0.440  0.313  
  0.063  0.708  0.500 0.687 0.506 0.309    
Italy 0.293  - 0.033  - 1.970 - 0.255 2.233 0.452  0.114  -0.087  
  0.218  0.396  0.824 0.696 0.801 0.795    
G4 Japan 0.197  0.108  1.044** 0.171 - 3.003** 3.376**  0.756  0.700  
  0.263  0.124  0.004 0.188 0.003 0.027    
Australia - 0.100  0.076  - 0.708 1.022 1.017 - 3.183  0.097  -0.108  
  0.654  0.580  0.647 0.284 0.290 0.800    
Germany - 0.289  0.079**  - 7.351 0.175 6.930 1.488  0.440  0.313  
  0.140  0.001  0.873 0.438 0.880 0.111    
Brazil - 0.380***  - 0.050  0.079 1.018  - 0.208 14.684**  0.365  0.220  
  0.075  0.401  0.842 0.177 0.256 0.019    
Hong Kong 0.433***  - 0.037  - 0.239 0.580 0.305 - 1.567  0.397  0.260  
  0.028  0.691  0.793 0.084 0.761 0.719    
Spain - 0.169  0.146  16.773 - 0.591 - 18.832 14.427  0.070  -0.395  
  0.624  0.693  0.968 0.916 0.964 0.385    
Ireland - 0.094  0.117  4.645 - 0.311 - 6.533 10.972  0.185  -0.105  
  0.735  0.193  0.873 0.648 0.829 0.327    
** 5% Significance Level, *** 10% Significance Level 
 
Table A1. Multivariate Regression Model I when  
 ∎ Dependent Variable : 









Regression Model: Q3 2007 ~ Q4 2011 
 
Country 
	1  	1  1 1 1  
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value 
G1 United States 0.528***  - 1.149  - 2.797 1.431*** 0.829 7.683  0.676  0.528  
  0.052  0.225  0.168 0.067 0.329 0.201    
France 0.577***  0.187  - 39.876 1.021 40.768 - 3.358  0.567  0.370  
  0.070  0.387  0.749 0.133 0.744 0.343    
G2 Greece - 0.221  - 0.043  - 662.008 2.911 661.901 2.070  0.155  - 0.314  
  0.571  0.560  0.449 0.310 0.449 0.681    
Republic of Korea 0.007**  - 0.020  - 0.015 0.010** 0.041** - 0.174**  0.779  0.679  
  0.015  0.619  0.322 0.025 0.046 0.011    
Finland 0.224  - 0.145  217.073 0.361 - 215.066 - 6.045  0.670  0.520  
  0.359  0.334  0.130 0.187 0.132 0.140    
Netherlands 0.212  0.210  - 667.732** 0.929 668.461** - 1.818  0.482  0.247  
  0.430  0.283  0.024 0.261 0.024 0.661    
Sweden 0.352  - 0.121  2.894 0.262 0.631 - 12.566  0.495  0.265  
  0.277  0.567  0.220 0.678 0.345 0.232    
United Kingdom 0.179  0.146   - 0.354 0.725 0.705 - 0.662  0.787  0.690  
  0.514  0.183  0.724 0.135 0.116 0.848    
Thailand - 0.003  0.069  - 2.779 0.715 4.154*** - 14.602  0.258  - 0.079  
   0.992  0.824  0.163 0.161 0.086 0.191    
G3 Mexico 0.509**  - 0.041  0.105 0.220  - 0.324 2.517  0.623  0.434  
  0.035  0.704  0.937 0.595 0.685 0.673    
Norway 0.185  - 0.234  3.837 0.211 - 3.658 2.713  0.734  0.613  
  0.423  0.172  0.112 0.542 0.243 0.577    
Portugal 0.441  0.141  8.926 - 0.010 - 9.187 1.446  0.405  0.134  
  0.136  0.230  0.948 0.988 0.947 0.347    
Italy 0.491  - 0.161  - 67.868 - 0.324 66.017 8.794  0.376  0.092  
  0.135  0.161  0.663 0.535 0.671 0.169    
G4 Japan - 0.132  - 0.049  - 0.781 - 0.189*** 2.311 - 2.921  0.480  0.244  
  0.671  0.427  0.615 0.098 0.247 0.175    
Australia 0.312  - 0.181  1.081 0.472 0.845 - 11.907**  0.742  0.625  
  0.155  0.350  0.304 0.562 0.232 0.023    
Germany - 0.004  - 0.006  42.911 - 0.210 - 42.312 - 1.518  0.409  0.140  
  0.989  0.891  0.547 0.177 0.552 0.147    
Brazil 0.509***  - 0.097**  0.221 0.019 - 0.211 9.315***  0.789  0.692  
  0.065  0.023  0.489 0.938 0.107 0.074    
Hong Kong 0.096  - 0.192  1.829 1.179 - 3.399 19.229  0.524  0.308  
  0.734  0.502  0.571 0.033 0.399 0.339    
Spain - 0.217  - 0.126  216.599 1.992 - 216.435 - 1.174  0.189  - 0.180  
  0.419  0.552  0.601 0.382 0.600 0.925    
Ireland - 0.415  - 0.031  - 0.302 0.011 0.574 1.451  0.227  - 0.125  
  0.273  0.737  0.926 0.989 0.860 0.688    
** 5% Significance Level, *** 10% Significance Level 
 
Table A2. Multivariate Regression Model I when  
 ∎ Dependent Variable : 











Regression Model: Q2 2000 ~ Q2 2007 
 
Country 
	1  	1  1 1 1  
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value 
G1 United States 0.275  - 0.052  0.140 - 0.539 0.264 - 0.775  0.617  0.530  
  0.178  0.694  0.747 0.105 0.141 0.569    
France 0.401**  0.304  229.325 0.427 - 227.724 - 6.376***  0.546  0.443  
  0.021  0.308  0.138 0.805 0.141 0.081    
G2 Greece 1.000**  0.000  0.000** 0.000 0.000** 1.000**  1.000  1.000  
  0.000  0.449  0.007 0.915 0.007 0.000    
Republic of Korea - 0.187  0.312  1.898 - 0.379 3.379 - 30.984  0.120  - 0.194  
  0.510  0.855  0.771 0.918 0.728 0.481    
Finland - 0.123  0.272  128.772 0.357 - 127.163 - 5.283  0.172  - 0.016  
  0.584  0.176  0.634 0.776 0.639 0.339    
Netherlands 0.430**  0.666***  - 201.760 2.050 203.994 - 11.525  0.614  0.526  
  0.005  0.079  0.554 0.459 0.551 0.180    
Sweden - 0.018  0.509  - 8.461 - 1.408 11.227*** - 9.746  0.413  0.280  
  0.934  0.403  0.144 0.548 0.053 0.330    
United Kingdom 0.034  - 0.238  - 2.462 0.477 1.651*** 5.339  0.198  0.015  
  0.849  0.433  0.151 0.700 0.072 0.479    
Thailand 0.094  0.014  1.017 - 0.598  - 1.269 5.130  0.081  - 0.128  
  0.687  0.967  0.468 0.670 0.426 0.625    
G3 Mexico - 0.119  - 0.064  - 0.919 - 0.707 0.153 10.925**  0.187  0.002  
  0.563  0.796  0.311 0.562 0.802 0.034    
Norway - 0.462***  1.489  - 5.914 - 0.854 7.116 - 8.214  0.170  - 0.018  
  0.081  0.146  0.338 0.368 0.363 0.503    
Portugal - 0.319  - 0.032  - 277.811 - 0.724 276.962 8.314  0.146  - 0.048  
  0.134  0.973  0.482 0.626 0.484 0.368    
Italy 0.056  - 0.409  27.752 1.896 - 20.382 - 26.306**  0.478  0.359  
  0.801  0.761  0.586 0.613 0.689 0.014    
G4 Japan - 0.322***  1.283**  - 0.504 0.229 11.651** - 19.092**  0.565  0.466  
  0.090  0.011  0.569 0.505 0.000 0.000    
Australia - 0.052  0.161  5.236** - 0.191 2.470*** - 49.552**  0.323  0.170  
  0.795  0.625  0.030 0.891 0.089 0.013    
Germany 0.219  0.006  199.105 - 0.159 - 194.503 - 15.416  0.342  0.192  
  0.320  0.998  0.684 0.947 0.691 0.119    
Brazil 0.282  - 1.136  - 1.369 - 0.255 0.370 9.089  0.189  0.005  
  0.205  0.144  0.352 0.926 0.580 0.675    
Hong Kong - 0.044  - 0.071  1.469 - 1.618** - 1.053 7.575  0.370  0.227  
  0.793  0.830  0.369 0.010 0.557 0.335    
Spain - 0.284  - 0.443  355.464 - 3.232 - 354.882 3.410  0.435  0.152  
  0.336  0.120  0.294 0.464 0.294 0.789    
Ireland 0.078  - 0.649  - 93.299 - 1.277 89.911 19.685  0.217  - 0.063  
  0.763  0.435  0.286 0.526 0.322 0.548    
** 5% Significance Level, *** 10% Significance Level 
 
Table A3. Multivariate Regression Model II when  
 ∎ Dependent Variable :  









Regression Model: Q3 2007 ~ Q4 2011 
 
Country 
	1  	1  1 1 1  
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value P-value 
G1 United States - 0.312  - 0.028  - 0.512 - 0.089 0.074 4.129***  0.180  - 0.193  
  0.360  0.756  0.474 0.735 0.808 0.070    
France - 0.497  - 0.499  33.427 0.403 - 32.657 1.081  0.175  - 0.200  
  0.171  0.311  0.870 0.703 0.873 0.849    
G2 Greece - 0.226  - 1.264  - 6422.495*** 32.764** 6426.065*** - 11.167  0.585  0.355  
  0.386  0.365  0.057 0.007 0.057 0.531    
Republic of Korea - 0.189  - 0.014   0.020 - 0.008 - 0.027 0.151  0.117  - 0.284  
  0.526  0.483  0.857 0.768 0.849 0.734    
Finland - 0.127  - 0.114  - 210.688 - 1.073 206.684 16.420  0.315  0.004  
  0.740  0.856  0.555 0.138 0.561 0.126    
Netherlands - 0.571  - 0.667***  474.603 - 2.430** - 473.143 1.713  0.625  0.454  
  0.034  0.067  0.171 0.033 0.173 0.744    
Sweden - 0.349  0.413  0.278 - 2.635** 1.623*** - 6.609  0.582  0.393  
  0.213  0.319  0.924 0.007 0.074 0.615    
United Kingdom - 0.235  - 0.878  1.917 - 1.292 1.453 - 7.887  0.461  0.216  
  0.472  0.305  0.537 0.370 0.277 0.462    
Thailand 0.039  0.232  0.804 - 0.588 - 1.248 6.352  0.203  - 0.159  
  0.902  0.488  0.681 0.253 0.590 0.565    
G3 Mexico 0.007  - 0.296  3.490 - 0.235 - 2.658 - 2.600  0.469  0.203  
  0.982  0.639  0.380 0.846 0.271 0.881    
Norway 0.153  0.242  - 0.037 - 0.139 - 1.357 6.335  0.113  - 0.290  
  0.627  0.579  0.993 0.832 0.815 0.497    
Portugal - 0.081  0.031  261.445 - 0.435 - 261.734 2.982  0.125  - 0.272  
  0.773  0.964  0.452 0.801 0.452 0.433    
Italy 0.232  - 0.809  - 193.743 - 0.062 199.080 - 21.433  0.333  0.031  
  0.513  0.423  0.697 0.970 0.688 0.285    
G4 Japan - 0.135  - 0.424  8.552 - 0.567 - 16.941*** 16.887  0.345  0.047  
  0.638  0.772  0.255  0.276 0.085 0.104    
Australia 0.085  - 0.676**  1.613 - 0.417 0.942 - 14.048**  0.556  0.355  
  0.710  0.019  0.209 0.670 0.267 0.026    
Germany 0.161  0.130  - 474.667 0.002 478.742 - 11.021  0.426  0.165  
  0.616  0.949  0.332 0.999 0.328 0.122    
Brazil - 0.087  - 4.257**  5.124** 3.185*** - 0.613 - 9.336  0.506  0.281  
  0.706  0.017  0.020 0.057 0.422 0.753    
Hong Kong - 0.196  - 0.074  1.743 - 0.208 - 3.292 18.468  0.237  - 0.109  
  0.502  0.796  0.595 0.681 0.421 0.365    
Spain 0.481  0.419  1172.698*** - 0.165 - 1169.884*** - 15.664  0.319  0.009  
  0.143  0.296  0.074 0.960 0.074 0.401    
Ireland 0.228  1.917  - 2.784 0.057 1.058 12.029  0.276  - 0.053  
  0.531  0.197  0.825 0.984 0.933 0.398    
** 5% Significance Level, *** 10% Significance Level 
 
Table A4. Multivariate Regression Model II when  
 ∎ Dependent Variable :  











Q2 2000 ~ Q2 2007 
 Country 	1 1 1 1 	1  
G1 United States 
France √ √ 
G2 Greece √ √ 
Republic of Korea 
Finland √ √ 
Netherlands √ √ 




Norway √ √ 
Portugal √ √ 
Italy √ √ 
G4 Japan 
Australia 
Germany √ √ 
Brazil 
Hong Kong √ √ 
Spain 
Ireland √ √ 
 
Table A5. Multicollinearity Test (Model I when )  
 
: Independent variables having “√” indicates that there 
exists multicollinearity with other ones. This is judged if 
variance inflation factor (VIF) is larger than 10. 
 
Q3 2007 ~ Q4 2011 
 Country 	1 1 1 1 	1  
G1 United States 
France √ √ 
G2 Greece 
Republic of Korea √ √ 
Finland √ √ 




G3 Mexico √ 
Norway √ √ 
Portugal √ √ 
Italy √ √ 
G4 Japan 
Australia 
Germany √ √ 
Brazil 
Hong Kong √ √ 
Spain √ √ 
Ireland √ √ 
 
Table A6. Multicollinearity Test (Model I when ) 
 
: Independent variables having “√” indicates that there 
exists multicollinearity with other ones. This is judged if 




Q2 2000 ~ Q2 2007 
 Country 	 	1 1 1 1 	1  
G1 United States 
France √ √ 
G2 Greece √ √ 
Republic of Korea 
Finland √ √ 
Netherlands √ √ 




Norway √ √ 
Portugal √ √ 
Italy √ √ 
G4 Japan 
Australia 
Germany √ √ 
Brazil 
Hong Kong √ √ 
Spain 
Ireland √ √ 
 
Table A7. Multicollinearity Test (Model II when ) 
 
: Independent variables having “√” indicates that there 
exists multicollinearity with other ones. This is judged if 
variance inflation factor (VIF) is larger than 10. 
 
Q3 2007 ~ Q4 2011 
 Country 	 	1  1 1 1 	1  
G1 United States 
 France √ √ 
G2 Greece 
Republic of Korea √ √ 
Finland √ √ 




G3 Mexico √ 
Norway √ √ 
Portugal √ √ 
Italy √ √ 
G4 Japan 
Australia 
Germany √ √ 
Brazil 
Hong Kong √ √ 
Spain √ √ 
Ireland √ √ 
 
Table A8. Multicollinearity Test (Model II when )
 
: Independent variables having “√” indicates that there 
exists multicollinearity with other ones. This is judged if 




APPENDIX III  Impulse - Response Relationship: Figures 
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2008년 금융위기를 전후한 국가별 









본 연구는 2008년 글로벌 금융위기를 전후하여 기업의 자금조달경로에 
어떠한 변화가 발생했는지를 확인하고 그것이 주는 시사점은 무엇인지를 
분석하는 데 초점이 맞추어져 있다. 이를 위해서 기업의 자금조달경로를 
크게 직접금융과 간접금융으로 나누었으며, 회사채와 은행대출을 각각을 
대표하는 경로로 가정했다. 또한 본 사안과 관련한 현상이 전세계적으로 
유사한 경향을 보이는지를 확인하기 위해서 20개의 표본 국가를 선정하
였다.  
 
각 표본국가별로 은행대출과 회사채의 분기별 증감 및 증감률 자료를 통
해 시차상관관계분석, 회귀분석, Granger 인과관계분석, 그리고 벡터자기
회귀모형(VAR)을 통한 충격반응함수 분석을 실시하였다. 그 결과, 두 경
로 사이에는 대체관계가 존재하고, 본 대체관계의 정도는 금융위기 이후
에 강화되는 모습을 보였다.  
 
이러한 결과는 회사채 시장이 지니고 있는 부도위험 등을 적절하게 통제
하는 수준에서 (회사채 시장의) 규모를 키우고 거래를 활성화 시킬 수 
있다면, 기업의 간접금융경로에 경색이 발생하더라도 그와 같은 직접금
융경로를 통해 본 충격을 완화시켜, 경제가 경착륙 하는 것을 막아줄 수 
있다는 일련의 정책적 함의를 제시한다고 볼 수 있다.   
 
 
주 요 어: 자금조달경로, 은행대출, 회사채, 대체관계, 글로벌 금융위기  
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